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Dean and Nadine Johnson borrowed money from First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A. to build a house. They were 
concerned that money from their construction loan might be 
improperly disbursed. They therefore told First Security that 
they wanted to review all draw requests before disbursements 
were made. First Security denied this request. It told the 
Johnsons that it was an experienced construction lender with 
special expertise in the area of draw requests. It promised 
the Johnsons that it would ensure that the loan proceeds were 
properly disbursed. 
The Johnsons believed First Security. Unfortunately, 
First Security betrayed the Johnsons' trust and breached its 
promise by disbursing funds that the building contractor 
converted to his own use. These facts, which must be taken as 
true for purposes of this proceeding, support claims for breach 
of contract, negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. This 
Court should therefore reinstate the Johnsons claims against 
First Security. 
I. The District Court erred by dismissing the 
Johnsons' claims based on the contract between 
the parties. 
This case is before the Court on appeal of the 
District Court's dismissal for failure to state a claim. At 
the motion to dismiss stage, the Court must take as true all of 
the factual statements contained in the Johnsons' Complaint. 
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The Complaint states a cause of action for breach of the 
written contract between the Johnsons and First Security as 
modified or for breach of a subsequent oral contract between 
them. 
First Security breached its written contract as 
modified by disbursing funds without verifying that draw 
requests it received from Polar Bear Homes were for labor and 
materials used in the Johnsons' home. The District Court 
dismissed this claim on the ground that the written contract 
unambiguously required the Johnsons to guarantee Polar Bear's 
draw requests. The District Court erred when it dismissed this 
claim. 
The written contract between the Johnsons and First 
Security is ambiguous. First Security correctly states that a 
contract is ambiguous if "the words used to express the meaning 
and intention of the parties are insufficient in a sense that 
the contract may be understood to reach two or more plausible 
meanings." , cited at p. 6 of First Security's Brief. In 
addition, a contract is ambiguous when the writing leaves 
uncertain or incomplete the parties' rights and duties. Barnes 
v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah App. 1988). 
This agreement is ambiguous under both standards. 
First Security relies on the final paragraph of the document 
which reads: 
-2-
In consideration of the sum of $1.00 and for 
the purpose of inducing the First Security 
Bank of Utah, National Association, to 
accept the foregoing Agreement the 
undersigned hereby guarantee the performance 
of said Agreement. 
Even hindsight does not penetrate the armor of 
unintelligibility that shields this paragraph from meaningful 
interpretation. The words lead the reasonable reader to 
multiple plausible interpretations. The paragraph may have 
been intended to make Polar Bear responsible to First Security 
if the Johnsons defaulted on their agreement to repay the 
construction loan. This form contract may have been generally 
intended to be used for corporate transactions and the 
guarantee was added to impose personal liability. As used in 
this transaction, the paragraph would simply require the 
Johnsons to guarantee their own performance. 
In addition, the guarantee renders ambiguous the 
meaning of the term "undersigned" which, in the Building and 
Loan Agreement, refers only to the Johnsons. Because only the 
Johnsons are "undersigned" within the meaning of the Building 
and Loan Agreement, First Security is not insulated from 
contract liability for disbursing funds in violation of the 
terms of the agreement. The interpretation urged by First 
Security—that Polar Bear was a party to both the Building and 
Loan Agreement and Guarantee—is the single most implausible of 
all interpretations, and cannot be adopted at the motion to 
dismiss stage. 
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This "guarantee" paragraph also leaves uncertain the 
Johnsons1 rights and duties. It does not even suggest by 
inference, much less state unambiguously, that the Johnsons 
have the duty to verify Polar Bear's draw requests. First 
Security drafted this agreement. If it had wanted the Johnsons 
to free First Security of its own duties under the Agreement 
and to guarantee the draw requests or the actions of Polar 
Bear, it could have at least found words to clearly achieve 
this objective. Because the contract is ambiguous, the 
District Court must take evidence to determine its intended 
meaning. Jarman v. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, 794 P.2d 492 
(Utah App. 1990); Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. 
Daskalas, 785 P.2d 1112, 1118 (Utah App. 1989). 
The Johnsons' complaint alleges that First Security 
agreed to review the draw requests and safeguard that the 
proceeds were distributed properly. This allegation is not the 
product of a tortured reading of the contract or mere 
statements uttered by Bank personnel, but rather emanates from 
obligations expressly assumed by First Security. Paragraph 5 
of the Agreement imposes an express duty on the Bank to 
disburse funds only for labor and materials used on the 
project. First Security's argument that it owed the Johnsons 
no duty simply ignores the express language of paragraph 5 of 
its Agreement. The last sentence of paragraph 5 states: 
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Such disbursements may be made to any of the 
undersigned/ or, at the option of the Bank, 
may be made to contractors, materialmen and 
laborers, or any of them, for work or labor 
furnished in connection with such 
improvements." 
Having exercised its option to pay contractors 
directly and to bypass the Johnsons, the Bank cannot disregard 
its duty to pay only for work provided for construction of the 
Johnsons' house. By paying the draw requests without review, 
First Security breached this unambiguous duty. 
Irrespective of considerations of contract ambiguity, 
the District Court was obligated to consider testimony about 
the existence and terms of the subsequent agreement by First 
Security to verify the draw requests. A written contract may 
be modified by oral agreement between the parties. Cordillera 
Corp. v. Heard, 592 P.2d 12 (Colo.App. 1978). Parol evidence 
is proper to show subsequent oral agreements to modify a 
written contract. Silver Dollar Club v. Cosgriff Neon Company, 
389 P.2d 923 (Nev. 1964) . 
II. The District Court erred by dismissing the 
Johnsons' negligence claim. 
The Johnsons' Complaint alleges that First Security 
owed them a duty to use reasonable care in disbursing funds 
from their construction loan. First Security takes the 
position that its common law duty is subsumed by its duty as 
spelled out in the contract. This position is contradictory 
-5-
since First Security also argues that it owes no duty under the 
contract. 
In addition, First Security's position is unsupported 
by the law. A bank is obligated to act reasonably in advising 
its customers about their financial transactions. In Nevada 
Nat'l. Bank v. Gold Star Meat Company, 89 Nev. 427, 514 P.2d 
651 (1973), the Nevada Supreme Court held: 
where a bank office through its officer 
undertakes to give advice, even 
gratuitously, that officer is bound to use 
the skill and expertise which he has or 
which he could be presumed to have. When 
that officer negligently or carelessly 
attempts to discharge that duty by 
misrepresenting facts within his knowledge, 
the bank should be held responsible for 
those misrepresentations. 
514 P.2d at 654. See also, Bank of Nevada v. Butler 
Aviation-O'Hare, Inc., 616 P.2d 398 (Nev. 1980). 
The law has progressed past the point where a party 
will be heard to assert the existence of boilerplate 
disclaimers to defend actions where the conduct of the parties 
was contrary to the standardized provision asserted. Courts 
will no longer enforce even unambiguous provisions in 
standardized contracts which are contrary to a party's separate 
representation of intent which is reasonably relied upon. 
This principle was acknowledged in Darner Motor Sales 
v. Universal Underwriters, 140 Ariz. 383, 682 P.2d 388, (1984), 
wherein the Court expressly rejected the notion that provisions 
of a standardized contract could be set up as a defense to a 
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negligence claim. In response to the assertion that failure to 
read and understand a contract provision precluded an action 
for negligence, the Court stated this this nation 
prides itself on a tradition of allowing a 
person to rely upon the words of another 
who, because of special knowledge, 
undertakes to act as an advisor. If an 
agent has an economic self-interest in 
imparting information, sound policy does 
require that the agent's duty to speak 
without negligence be reinforced in basic 
tort principles inherent in the common law. 
682 P.2d at 402. 
Whether the Agreement required First Security to 
supervise and verify the draw requests of Polar Bear or whether 
it did not, when the Bank chose to do so and informed the 
Johnsons that it was undertaking that responsibility, it was 
obligated to exercise reasonable care in performing such 
services. 
Ill. The District Court erred in dismissing the 
Johnsons' claim for breach of fiduciary duty. 
First Security assumed a fiduciary duty to the 
Johnsons when it undertook to perform special services based on 
its special knowledge and expertise. The Johnsons' Complaint 
alleges that First Security told them it had special expertise 
in the area of draw requests and that it would ensure the loan 
proceeds were disbursed fairly. In reliance on these 
representations, and at the express instruction of First 
Security, the Johnsons did not review the draw requests. 
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A fiduciary or confidential relationship may be 
created by circumstances where equity will imply a higher duty 
in a relationship because the trusting party has been induced 
to relax the care and vigilance he would ordinarily exercise. 
Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 
1982). Whether such a relationship exists is necessarily a 
fact issue that cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss. Such 
issues generally require factual development to determine 
whether a plaintiff will be able to prove a set of facts 
entitling them to relief for breach of fiduciary duty. In Re 
Nat. Mortg. Equity Corp. Mortg. Pool Cert., 682 F.Supp. 1073 
(C.D.Cal. 1987). 
The Johnsons* Complaint states a claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty. "[A] claim for breach of fiduciary duty is 
sufficient if it alleges the fiduciary relationship and its 
breach, as these two elements alone would establish 
liability." Young v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 790 F.2d 567 (7th 
Cir. 1986) with reference to Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
§ 874 and comment b. See also Giroir v. MBank Dallas, N.A. 676 
F.Supp. 915 (E.D.Ark. 1987) (the elements of a claim for breach 
of a fiduciary duty are the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship, a breach of the defendant's duty, and damages.) 
The Johnsons' Complaint alleges that First Security was its 
fiduciary, that First Security breached its fiduciary duty, and 
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that the Johnsons were damaged. Whether such issues can be 
proven will require factual development. 
CONCLUSION 
First Security Bank seeks to hide behind a boilerplate 
document. It wants to interpret the document to mean that the 
Johnsons are liable for any action of Polar Bear Homes and that 
the Bank is free of any responsibility for its disbursement of 
the Johnsons' loan proceeds. Yet, even the Bank's own 
boilerplate cannot shield it from its wrongdoing. Both the 
express language of the Agreement and the subsequent oral 
agreements require First Security to scrutinize Polar Bear's 
actions and be responsible for its failure to so do. First 
Security took upon itself this obligation and must now stand up 
for its shortcomings. 
Respectfully submitted this 
7 ^ day of /gfeUA^/, 
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